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SHAREHOLDER VOICE IN COMPLEX 
INTERMEDIATED PROXY SYSTEMS: BLOCKCHAIN 
TECHNOLOGY AS A SOLUTION? 
 
 





Despite the great importance of shareholder engagement to date, the 
exercise of shareholder voting and other rights is substantially flawed. There 
are several different intermediated securities models used around the world 
that all drive a wedge between the issuer and the beneficial owner of the 
shares and the accompanying rights. In many jurisdictions including the US 
and the UK, the beneficial owner is not the legal owner of the securities, but 
rather an intermediary is considered the formal legal share owner. Other 
intermediated systems recognize the direct ownership of the investor, but 
impose a legal fiction on the number of intermediated tiers in the securities 
chain, ignoring practical holding chains (the Spanish system). This and the 
use of omnibus accounts at many levels in the (cross-border) intermediated 
chains have resulted in costly problems at the expense of shareholders, 
which are not solved by current regulatory initiatives.  
Blockchain technology can address the main problems with the current 
intermediated proxy voting and engagement systems and facilitate the two 
largest needs in the intermediated chains today, namely i) the identification 
of shareholders by issuers and, ii) the end-to-end confirmation that the votes 
are exercised by the beneficial owners and are correctly included in the 
voting outcomes. Moreover, blockchains have the potential to solve pressing 
issues in the shareholder stewardship debate, for instance by increasing 
engagement between shareholders and companies on voting items that 
(potentially) receive large dissent rates, and making more transparent the 
role of proxy advisors in institutional shareholder voting decisions. 
However, because of the involvement of many intermediaries that may see 
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in the introduction of blockchain a disruption of their existing business 
models, it is expected that reform may take a while in many markets, 
particularly without any serious harmonisation efforts. Consequently, 
involvement of regulators is key to achieving the full potential of 
shareholder voting and engagement using blockchains. 
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The two classical options for a shareholder with concerns about the 
management‘s conduct include selling their shares or voicing their 
concerns.
1
 Whereas selling the shares, or exit, is an economic solution, voice 
is a political one that is considered more desirable from a corporate 
governance perspective.
2
 The most important formal voice mechanism is 
shareholder voting. Of course, many scholars have discussed the economic 
problems related to corporate voting, including rational apathy and the 
unwillingness of small shareholders to vote and incur voting costs without 
having a chance to become the pivotal voter.
3
 However, shareholder voting 
has never been more important in corporate law than it is today.
4
 
Institutional investors have become an important shareholder class, and the 
shares of many companies are aggregated in the portfolios of large asset 
managers. The spectacular increase in assets under management of large US 
institutional investors (including Blackrock, State Street and Vanguard), has 
forced these investors to expand their portfolios to foreign markets, leading 




1 See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). 
2 See id. at 15-17.  
3 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischer, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. L. & ECON. 2 
(1983); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW (1996). 
4 See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 GEO. 
L.J. 1227-1279 (2008). 
5 See Edward B. Rock & Marcel Kahan, Index Funds and Corporate Governance: Let 
Shareholders be Shareholders, NYU LAW AND ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPER No. 18-39 (Apr. 
4, 2019). 
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Hedge funds, actively managed mutual funds, and the systematic 
institutional ownership have catalyzed the exercise of the shareholder voice. 
Hedge funds have strong incentives to take the lead in actions to overcome 
corporate performance issues, and if doing so does not result in a solution 
and corporate management resists, the institutional investors with their 
widespread ownership usually decide.
6
 In addition, large institutional 
investors can use their ownership portfolio to decide on market-wide 
corporate governance standards like CEO duality and ESG issues, for which 
their voting decisions are also largely influenced by their engagement 
policies and the voting recommendations of their proxy advisors.
7
  
Several regulatory initiatives pressure institutional investors to exercise 
their voice, given their widespread presence in many companies. For 
instance, in the US, the fiduciary duty of private pension funds is defined by 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (―ERISA‖), and 
proxy votes are considered ―rights which must be prudently exercised 
consistent with the interests of pension plan members and fund investors.‖
8
 
In addition, since 2003, mutual funds are required to disclose their proxy 
voting policies in the US.
9
 In Europe, the 2017 Revised Shareholder Rights 
Directive (―SRD II‖) requires institutional investors and asset managers to 
disclose their engagement policies and the implementation of these policies 
on a comply-or-explain basis.
10
 Although there is no obligation to vote at the 
European level, this comply-or-explain provision also includes the 
disclosure of how these institutional investors have voted their shares and 
how they are conducting dialogue with their investees. Similarly, many 
stewardship codes such as those in the UK, Japan or the Netherlands 
recommend that institutional investors disclose their policies and vote their 
shares. 
Despite the pivotal role of shareholder voting in today‘s corporate 
governance, current shareholder voting systems are substantially flawed in 
many countries. Headlines of notorious cases in which proxy votes were 
counted wrongly and led to false voting outcomes (for instance, ―P&G 




6 See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 863 (2013).  
7 See Rock & Kahan, supra note 5.  
8 Also state pension funds, mutual funds, and endowments generally follow the ERISA rules. 
See Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not 
Market Value, 2 JOURNAL OF LAW, FINANCE, AND ACCOUNTING 247-274 (2017).  
9 SEC, Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, Release No. IA-2106, 68 FR 6585 (Feb. 7, 
2003). 
10 Directive (EU) 2017/828 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 
amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder 
engagement, 2017 O.J. (L 132/60). 
11See Scott Deveau, P&G Climbs After Peltz Scores Surprise Board Victory in Recount, 
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 15, 2017),    
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distorts Yahoo vote on Yang‖
12
), or even shares wrongly voted by mistake 
in structural decision matters (―T. Rowe Price Voted for the Dell Buyout by 
Accident‖
13
) are widespread. Despite the current heavy focus on 
(institutional) shareholder voting and engagement, often also referred to as 
shareholder stewardship,
14
 there are not yet sufficient regulatory measures 
regarding these so-called ―indirect‖ or ―intermediated‖ holding systems. 
Already in 2008, Kahan and Rock warned about fundamental flaws in the 
US intermediated securities system in their seminal paper.
15
 The authors 
concluded that the system was ―crude, imprecise, and fragile.‖
16
 The US 
system, characterized by share immobilization and with record holder Cede 
& Company (the nominee of the US CSD
17
), was considered a temporary, 
sub-optimal solution at its introduction in the beginning of the 1970s, as the 
technology was not ready yet to establish a direct connection between 
shareholders and issuer.
18
 Even today, the basic structures of the 
intermediated systems remain the same. Across the Atlantic, the recent 
implementation of the SRD II and related Implementing Regulation in 
Europe has significantly increased attention on the flawed passing of 
information, communication and votes between issuers and shareholders, 






12See Richard Waters, Error distorts Yahoo Vote on Yang, THE FINANCIAL TIMES (Aug. 5, 
2008) https://www.ft.com/content/18733ee6-633f-11dd-9fd0-0000779fd2ac.  
13See Matt Levine, T. Rowe Price Voted for the Dell Buyout by Accident, BLOOMBERG (May 
13, 2016) https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2016-05-13/t-rowe-price-voted-for-
the-dell-buyout-by-accident.  
14 For instance, see Dionysia Katelouzou, Shareholder Stewardship, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY 581-595 
(Beate Sjåfjell & Christopher M. Bruner eds., 2019).   
15 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 1230-1231. The authors show that many voting 
outcomes on important corporate law decisions are very close to the simple majority 
threshold of 50 per cent. Particularly, they quote a Delaware lawyer who estimates that ―in a 
contest that is closer than 55 to 45%, there is no verifiable answer to the question ‗who 
won?‘‖ 
16 Id. at 1279. 
17 Infra Part I.B. 
18 See David C. Donald, The Rise and Effects of the Indirect Holding System - How 
Corporate America Ceded its Shareholders to Intermediaries (Johann Wolfgang Goethe-
Universität Institute for Law and Finance, Working Paper Series No. 68, 2007), 
https://www.ilf-frankfurt.de/fileadmin/_migrated/content_uploads/ILF_WP_068.pdf.  
19 Infra Part II.C. See the Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1212 of 3 
September 2018 laying down minimum requirements implementing the provisions of 
Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards shareholder 
identification, the transmission of information and the facilitation of the exercise of 
shareholders rights, 2018 O.J. (L 223/1). 
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Modern technologies may be used to improve the current US and 





already pointed to the usefulness of blockchains. For instance, blockchains 
can provide shareholders with end-to-end confirmation that their votes were 
indeed cast as they intended and were included in the voting result. 
However, despite numerous initiatives, there has not yet been any reform, 
and all publicly known trials are only at the proof-of-concept stage.
22
 It is 
unclear whether this has to do with limitations of the current blockchains 
available (or other suitable technological solutions), or whether the principal 
obstacles to reform are not of a technical but rather a political nature, or 
maybe blockchains are simply too costly.
23
  
This research addresses whether and to what extent technological 
reform using blockchains can indeed improve shareholder voting and 
engagement. In the next section, we first briefly discuss the current different 
systems of intermediated securities including the ownership of these 
securities. Afterwards, we turn to the discussion of the current shareholder 
voting systems. In section III, we discuss the current regulatory initiatives 
including the SRD II and its Implementing Regulation. We describe 
blockchains and link their merits and disadvantages to the current flaws in 
shareholder voting and engagement. We expand the discussion to the 
implications of blockchains for corporate governance and provide a 
conclusion.  
 
I. INTERMEDIATED SECURITIES AND SHARE OWNERSHIP 
 
If an investor holds a share today, there is usually no physical paper 
certificate involved. The investor also does not hold the security directly 
 
20 See David Yermack, Corporate Governance and Blockchains, 21 Rev. Fin. 7 (2017); 
Federico Panisi, Ross P. Buckley & Douglas Arner, Blockchain and Public Companies: A 
Revolution in Share Ownership Transparency, Proxy Voting and Corporate Governance? 2 
STAN. J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL‘Y 189 (2019); Christoph Van der Elst & Anne Lafarre, 
Blockchain and Smart Contracting for the Shareholder Community, 20 EUROPEAN BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATION LAW REVIEW 111 (2019); George S. Geis, Traceable Shares and Corporate 
Law, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 227, 227-278 (2018); Spencer J. Nord, Blockchain Plumbing: A 
Potential Solution for Shareholder Voting, 21 U. PA J. BUS. L. 706 (2019); LOUISE GULLIFER 
& JENNIFER PAYNE, INTERMEDIATION AND BEYOND (2019). 
21 For an overview of initiatives, see Anne Lafarre & Christoph Van der Elst, Legal tech and 
blockchain for corporate governance and shareholders, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN DATA 
SCIENCE AND LAW 153-182 (Vanessa Mak, Eric Tjong Tjin Tai & Anna Berlee eds., 2018). 
22 Id.; Van der Elst & Lafarre, supra note 20.  
23 Kahan and Rock argue that Broadridge, with its monopoly, has an incentive to oppose a 
reform that would undermine its position. Similarly, brokers also would have incentives to 
oppose change to protect their customer relationships and their current business practices 
involving securities lending. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 1279. Yet, Broadridge was 
actually among the first parties developing blockchain technology to improve shareholder 
voting. Infra Part III.B.   
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with the issuer. Instead, there is an intermediated holding chain with at least 
one intermediary—but usually more—between the issuer and the investor. 
The most important intermediary in virtually every jurisdiction is the 
(national) Central Securities Depository (―CSD‖), which either provides the 
initial registration of the securities in a book-entry system, or provides and 
maintains the securities accounts at the top of the intermediated securities 
holding chain. For instance, the US system makes use of share 
immobilization, where immobilized security certificates are held by DTC 
and recorded as book-entry in its accounts. Another option is the use of 
dematerialized securities that are represented solely by an electronic book-
entry register of securities. UNIDROIT published the Legislative Guide on 
Intermediated Securities
24
 after having adopted the UNIDROIT Convention 
on Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities, introducing a 
categorization of an intermediated securities system based on share 
ownership characteristics. 
 
A. Domestic and International Situations 
 
The UNIDROIT Legislative Guide on Intermediated Securities outlines 
the different systems of intermediated holding structures. These 
intermediated holding structures include systems with immobilized 
securities certificates held by the national CSD, and systems that use 
dematerialized securities represented only by a book-entry register kept by 
the national CSD. Although domestic intermediate holding chains can be 
simple in theory, where investors (the beneficial owners)
25
 hold direct 
accounts with the CSD, in practice investor accounts are often maintained 
by other intermediaries holding direct or indirect accounts with the CSD. In 
addition, cross-border situations significantly add to the complexity of 
intermediated systems. Suppose that an investor is located in Country Y and 
the issuer in Country X. Usually, the issuer registers its securities with the 
CSD in the same country, in this case Country X.
26
 The intermediaries in 
this country hold accounts with Country X‘s CSD. The investor holds an 
account with its own intermediary in Country Y, and depending on whether 
this intermediary is (for instance) an international bank that has a direct 
connection with an intermediary in Country X that holds an account with the 
 
24 UNIDROIT is the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law.  
25 Beneficial owners herein are defined as the persons with the ultimate economic interest in 
the securities. 
26 The European CSD Regulation (―CSDR‖) allows issuers to choose any CSD established in 
the EU for recording their securities (infra Part II.C), but in practice, usually the issuer selects 
the home-state CSD.  
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These intermediated securities systems involve many intermediaries 
adding substantial costs. However, there are more significant problems than 
large cost inefficiencies per se. End-to-end vote confirmations cannot be 
provided, there are inaccuracies in voting outcomes, and moreover, votes 
can be cast in conflict with the beneficial owners‘ voting preference. For 
operational efficiency, oftentimes so-called ―omnibus accounts‖ are used, 
which are accounts that hold pooled securities on behalf of more than one 
investor.
28





it difficult to identify proprietary interests of beneficial owners. Moreover, 
in many systems, the separation of legal ownership and beneficial ownership 
creates additional difficulties.  
 
B. Five Different Ownership Models  
 
UNIDROIT has identified five models of intermediated securities 
systems based on the ownership of securities in the chain.
31
 These are: i) the 
trust model; ii) the security entitlement model; iii) the co-ownership model; 
iv) the individual ownership model, and; v) the contractual model.
32
  
Under the trust model, which is practiced in for instance the UK, the 
securities are provided to the CSD who keeps the register, and the 
intermediaries holding an account with the CSD are considered the legal 
owners of the securities. Once those intermediaries credit the securities to 
their account holders‘ securities accounts, they act as trustees for the 
account holders, who become beneficiaries and receive a beneficial interest 
(also known as an equitable interest) in the securities. In the UK, Euroclear 
(with the CREST-system) is the CSD and has no proprietary rights in 
securities and thus does not hold the securities on behalf of its 
 
27 Or there can be an international bank from a third country involved, e.g. from Country Z, 
making the connection between the intermediary from Country X and from Country Y.  
28 See Victoria Dixon, The Legal Nature of Intermediated Securities: An Insurmountable 
Obstacle to Legal Certainty?, in INTERMEDIATION AND BEYOND (Louise Gullifer & Jennifer 
Payne eds., 2019). 
29 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 1243.  
30 Note that in accordance with European legislation, intermediaries are obliged to offer 
investors the option of a segregated account. Infra Part II.C.  
31 See Dixon, supra note 28. 
32 In the contractual model, investors do not acquire a bundle of proprietary interests to the 
securities, but instead acquire contractual rights vis-à-vis the relevant intermediary, making 
the intermediated system a bundle of bilateral contracts. We do not discuss this model further 
here as the beneficial owner‘s interests in most (major) jurisdictions are not considered 
contractual only.  




 instead, it maintains a register, and each member (usually 
custodians and other financial institutions) on this register holds the 
securities directly from the issuer and is the legal owner.
34
 As the legal 
owner of the securities, the CREST-member is entitled to exercise voting, 
dividend and other shareholder rights. The member holds the securities on 
trust in (omnibus) accounts for its beneficial owners, who have a beneficial 
interest (also called an equitable interest) in the intermediated securities 
established by the chain of trusts. If there is yet another intermediary 
involved between the CREST-member and the beneficial owner, then this is 
the sub-trustee, who holds the beneficial interest in the securities on trust for 
its beneficial owners (which also may be in omnibus account).
35
  
In Australia, we can find another intermediated securities system 
following the trust model.
36
 However, whereas intermediaries (including 
custodians) hold assets for their clients on a trust, there is no CSD involved 
for ASX-listed securities as these holdings are held directly on the issuers‘ 
records.
37
 ASX uses the CHESS-system to both facilitate clearing and 
settlement of ASX securities and the record of these holdings. More 
specifically, to register shares on the CHESS-system, investors need to be 
―sponsored‖ by an authorised participant of the CHESS-subregister, which 
is usually a broker or settlement agent. Using a sponsorship agreement, 
these intermediaries operate the investor‘s holdings on the CHESS-
subregister without affecting the legal share ownership.
38
 These CHESS 
securities therefore are directly owned by the investor,
39
 but still have a form 
 




34 However, individual shareholders still had the option to hold paper certificates directly 
with the issuer, which remains a substantial amount in the UK. See BIS, Exploring the 
Intermediated Shareholding Model (BIS Research Paper Number 261,  2016).  
35 Id. 
36 UNIDROIT, supra note 24, at 19.  
37 See ASX, CHESS (2011), 
https://www.asx.com.au/documents/research/chess_brochure.pdf). See also Clearstream, 
Market Structure Australia (May 17, 2017), https://www.clearstream.com/clearstream-
en/products-and-services/market-coverage/asia-pacific/australia/market-infrastructure-
australia-1281670. 
38 Note that shareholders can choose to register their shares with CHESS or with an ―Issuer 
Sponsored subregister,‖ maintained by the company that issued the shares. Such subregisters 
are often administered by a third party (external registrars). Id at 3.  
39 As the ASX explains: ―CHESS shareholders are allocated a Holder Identification Number 
(commonly referred to as a HIN), which is similar in concept to a bank account number. Your 
HIN uniquely identifies you as the holder of shares on the CHESS subregister. Following 
your registration, ASX Settlement will send you a notification of your HIN. Keep this 
notification in a safe place as a record of your sponsor and your HIN. You should protect 
your HIN in the same way you protect your bank account number and not disclose it to 
anyone, unless required to do so in the normal course of business or by law.‖ See ASX, supra 
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of intermediation (section 15 of the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 
(―PPSA‖) also regards these securities as intermediated).
40
 
In the US security entitlement model, the Depository Trust and 
Clearing Corporation (―DTCC‖) is the permanent record owner for a vast 
majority of shares in the US.
41
 DTCC is also the formal owner of the stock 
and has two subsidiaries: Cede & Company, its nominee and record holder, 
and DTC, which functions as the CSD and where custodians and brokers 
hold accounts. Under Article 8 of the U.C.C., the beneficial owner is 
considered to be the holder of a ―securities entitlement‖ in a ―financial 
asset,‖ which includes shares.
42
 There are security entitlement holders at 
each level of the holding chain below the CSD. The beneficial owner has no 
ability to exercise any capital or control rights directly against the issuer, but 
the intermediaries at every tier pass on information to their account holders 
and exercise rights on their behalf. Intermediaries acting as custodians or 
brokerage firms hold omnibus accounts directly with DTCC.
43
 Therefore, 
these custodians need to keep records of the shareholdings of their 
(institutional) clients. Only in cases where different custodians are involved 
when shares are traded, a bookkeeping adjustment must be made to DTCC‘s 
omnibus accounts.  
Under the co-ownership model, the beneficial owner has fractional 
ownership of a pool of securities that are deposited with the CSD. Securities 
are pooled and belong collectively to the beneficial owners, making it 
impossible to identify a particular beneficial owner‘s holdings. This system 
is practiced in, for instance, Germany and the Netherlands. In the 
Netherlands, the majority of securities are held under the Securities Giro 
Administration and Transfer Act (Wge). Here, Euroclear Netherlands is the 
CSD that provides clearing and settlement activities required for security 
transfers. The beneficial owners hold securities accounts with their 
intermediaries (―affiliated institutions‖ under Dutch law), who in turn hold 




note 37, at 4. For Issuer Sponsored subregisters, ASX explains that shareholders ―will be 
allocated a unique Security holder Reference Number (also known as an SRN) by the 
relevant issuer. Your SRN uniquely identifies your holding on the Issuer Sponsored 
subregister. Unlike a HIN, your SRN will not identify any holdings on the CHESS 
subregister. Also, unlike a HIN, you will have a different SRN for each holding.‖ Id. at 5. 
40 See Personal Property Securities (Corporations and Other Amendments) Act 2011 (Cth), 
Explanatory Memorandum, 2. 
41 Some references report 85 per cent of the shares. See, e.g., Nord, supra note 20. The term 
used for these shares deposited with DTCC is in ―street name.‖  
42 UCC § 8-501(b); id. § 8-102(a)(9). See also Panisi, Buckley & Arner, supra note 20 (on 
the US intermediated securities model and share ownership).  
43 See Geis, supra note 20.  
44 The securities are kept in a collective deposit. In Dutch, this is called a ―verzameldepot,‖ 
and the securities are part of a ―gemeenschap.‖ To overcome the identification problems 
caused by these pooled accounts, Stichting Communicatiekanaal Aandeelhouders channeled 
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Due to the use of omnibus or pooled accounts in the aforementioned 
systems, they can be considered ―non-transparent.‖
45
 In contrast, in the 
individual ownership model which is practiced in most European 
jurisdictions, including for instance in France, Spain, Italy, Denmark, 
Sweden and Finland,
46
 the CSD and other intermediaries do not have any 
interest in the securities as the beneficial owner has legal, individual 
ownership over the securities that are located directly in the investor‘s 
securities account.
47
 For instance, in Spain, Iberclear (the Spanish CSD) 
keeps a register of securities and is also in charge of the clearing and 
settlement of transactions. An issuer needs to inform Iberclear when issuing 
securities so that these securities are recorded in the register of Iberclear, 
and if a transaction occurs between a buyer and a seller and the ownership 
of the seller and payments by the buyer are verified, the transfer occurs and 
the register is adjusted.
48
 Beneficial owners cannot acquire proprietary 
interests unless specific securities have been allocated to their accounts in 
the second tier of this system. However, it is important to note that only a 
―two-tier‖ book-entry system is used in Spain. In the first tier, Iberclear 
maintains accounts for its account holders, whereas in the second tier, the 
custodians and brokers maintain accounts for their beneficial owners. 
Hence, the Spanish model assumes that there is an intermediated chain with 
only two ownership tiers: the account holders of Iberclear (first tier) and the 
clients of these account holders (second tier). This creates non-transparent 
and unclear situations for the beneficial owner below the second tier in the 
Spanish intermediated system,
49
 let alone the many situations today that 
involve cross-border holdings.  






information and voting instructions between participating issuers and their participating 
shareholders for a number of years up to 2013. As of 2013, issuers are able to request 
information on the identity of their beneficial owners from the intermediaries that—as 
affiliated institutions—in turn hold securities account with Euroclear Netherlands. See 
Parliamentary Proceedings II 2008/09, 32 014, no. 3 (Memorie van Toelichting). 
45 UNIDROIT, supra note 24, at 25. 
46 But also Brazil, China, Norway and Japan. See Dixon, supra note 31.  
47 Note that those investors that wish to hold shares anonymously can hold their shares 
through a nominee. 
48 For more information, see Securities Registration System, IBERCLEAR, 
http://www.iberclear.es/ing/Services/Securities-Registration-System (last visited Sept. 2020).  
49 Francisco Garcimartin, The Geneva Securities Convention: a Spanish Perspective, in 
INTERMEDIATED SECURITIES: THE IMPACT OF THE GENEVA SECURITIES CONVENTION AND THE 
FUTURE EUROPEAN LEGISLATION 269 (Pierre-Henri Conac et al. eds., 2013). 
50 This figure is largely based on UNIDROIT, supra note 24, at 17-21. See also Victoria 
Dixon, The Legal Nature of Intermediated Securities: An Insurmountable Obstacle to Legal 
Certainty?, in INTERMEDIATION AND BEYOND (Louise Gullifer & Jennifer Payne eds., 2019). 
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II. SHAREHOLDER VOTING RIGHTS  
 
Investor ownership has two key elements that are embodied in shares: a 
right to control the firm, and a right to receive the firm‘s net earnings. 
Ownership here is defined as the entitlement to exercise the residual rights 
of control.
52
 Such residual control right exercised through corporate voting 
is important, as it allows shareholders to incorporate the unforeseen future 
and therefore has significant impact on outcomes ex post. However, the 
investor is not considered the legal owner of the security in many systems, 
and thus heavily depends on the significant number of intermediaries 
 
51 Note that the Individual Ownership Model shown in this Figure is based on the Spanish 
model; for other countries that adopted an Individual Ownership model, like France, the 
Figure would be slightly different.  
52 See John Armour & Michael J. Whincop, The Proprietary Foundations of Corporate Law, 
27 J. LEGAL STUD. 437 (2007). 
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present in the chain to i) exercise the right to vote and include this voting 
decision in the voting results with the issuer, and i) transmit information—
for instance on the shareholders‘ meeting—between the issuer and the 
investor. In the next sections, the US and UK proxy voting models are 
briefly discussed.   
 
A. Proxy voting in the US 
 
Under Delaware law, at the record date, the persons who are listed as 
registered owners of the shares in accordance with the company‘s books are 
entitled to receive the notice of and vote at the general meeting of 
shareholders.
53
 In other words, Delaware law assumes that shareholders 
(―stockholders‖) hold shares directly, which is not what happens in practice 
(the registered holder is Cede, the nominee of DTCC).
54
 Firms use the list of 
registered owners to determine who is entitled to vote and exercise other 
shareholder rights; in turn, these registered owners can authorize others to 
vote on their behalf by means of a proxy pursuant to section 212(c) DCGL. 
Therefore, under Delaware law, issuers often do not know their beneficial 
owners (for those shares hold in ―street name‖
55
) and depend on custodians 
and brokers to receive a list of the beneficial owners of the shares. Secondly, 
beneficial owners also depend on their intermediaries to obtain the proxy to 
vote ―their‖ shares.  
The US shareholder voting process usually contains the following 
steps: first, a corporation sending out its proxy materials (including the 
proxy cards, a proxy statement and the annual report) for a general meeting 
of shareholders involves receipt of a list of account holders from DTC, 
which includes an omnibus of all custodians and brokers that hold shares for 
their account holders. Next, the direct account holders (custodians, brokers) 
with DTC need to receive an omnibus proxy from Cede, which they in turn 
must provide to their account holders. These custodians also need to send 
the proxy materials to their account holders, which usually involves 
different levels in the intermediated chain, and collect and implement voting 
instructions and execute votes. These tasks, however, are usually outsourced 
to proxy services firms like Broadridge. In addition, beneficial owners like 
institutional investors often make use of proxy advisors that provide voting 
recommendations and transfer the voting instructions to the proxy services 
firm. Broadridge, or another intermediary, sends the proxies to a vote 
 
53 § 213 of DGCL.  
54 Supra Part I.B. 
55 Supra note 44.  
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tabulator (which may also involve Broadridge) that, finally, checks ―the 
formal validity‖ of the votes.
56
  
Perhaps the most salient example of this complex and non-transparent 
system is the 2013 leveraged buyout of Dell Inc.,
57
 where asset manager T. 
Rowe Price ended up casting its votes in favor of the buyout, despite its 
public opposition against this transaction, and therefore was not able to 
perfect appraisal rights. In T. Rowe Price‘s case, State Street was the DTC 
account holder that received an omnibus proxy from Cede. State Street 
outsourced the task of collecting and implementing voting instructions from 
its account holders (including T. Rowe Price) to Broadridge with a power of 
attorney authorizing Broadridge to execute the proxies on State Street‘s 
behalf. In turn, T. Rowe relied on Institutional Shareholder Services (―ISS‖) 
for the submission of voting instructions, which was computerized and 
automatically generated default voting instructions (with a ―yes‖ vote in 
case of any management-supported merger, as with the Dell leveraged 
buyout). T. Rowe Price voted against, yet the Dell shareholders‘ meeting 
was adjourned three times, and with the third adjournment, the voting 
instructions of T. Rowe Price were deleted, automatically resulting in the 
use of the default voting instruction and thus a ―yes‖ vote. This voting 
instruction was transferred from ISS to Broadridge, who also had received 
the voting rights from State Street (and in turn from Cede), and carried out 
the vote in the Dell merger.  
Yet, more went wrong in the Dell case. A ―stockholder‖ is the holder 
of record of stock in a corporation, and it is required that this stockholder 
continuously holds the shares through the effective date of the merger 
(section 262(a) DGCL). In the Dell appraisal litigation, this continuous 
holding requirement was not fulfilled. DTC issued certificates of shares in 
Cede‘s name, but some custodians and brokers, including JP Morgan, only 
held certificates of shares issued in the names of their own nominees, and 
thus Dell‘s shares were transferred to these nominees, and re-titled 
certificates were issued in their names. Dell argued that the continuous 
holding requirement was not fulfilled as this transfer resulted in new 
registered owners, and thus appraisal rights could not be exercised.  
  
B. Proxy voting in the UK 
 
 
56 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 1236. The vote tabulator does not check whether these 
proxy votes reflect the voting instructions of beneficial owners.  
57 Re Appraisal of Dell Inc., No. C.A. 9322-VCL, 2016 (Del. Ch. May 11, 2016). See Van 
der Elst & Lafarre, supra note 20.  
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Intermediaries in the CREST register are considered the legal owners 
of the securities.
58
 These intermediaries are also treated as shareholders 
under section 112(2) of the UK Companies Act 2006. This means that 
beneficial owners do not automatically have any shareholder rights and 
depend on their intermediaries to pass these rights.
59
  
Most issuers outsource the keeping of the shareholder register to an 
external registrar.
60
 CREST members that appear on the register are thus the 
legal owners, but these members may hold securities for beneficial owners 
through a pooled or designated nominee. If there is a shareholder‘s meeting, 
issuers (via the registrars) send the meeting information including the 
meeting notice to the custodians recorded in the shareholder register.
61
 
Section 333A UK CA 2006 requires issuers to provide an electronic address 
for receiving the proxy votes, which companies usually outsource to the 
registrar. Registrars collect proxy votes from individual investors, proxy 
advisors or other proxy voting intermediaries (which also can take place via 
the CREST system). Registrars also count the votes and compare them to 
the shareholdings recorded in the register. Proxy agents are usually situated 
somewhere in the proxy voting chain between custodian banks, investors 
and issuers and collect voting instructions particularly from smaller 
(institutional) investors and submit them to the registrar. Usually, 
institutional asset owners (or their asset managers) use proxy advisors, and 
often these proxy advisors engage with proxy agents and communicate 
voting instructions on the investors‘ behalf.  
For large asset owners, the UK proxy voting system usually does not 
cause large problems although they are not the legal share owners, as they 
often appoint their custodian directly and hold a segregated account with 
their custodian. They also will directly inform the custodian about their 
voting instructions, which the custodian passes on to the registrar of the 
issuer.
62
 However, if an asset manager is involved that holds a pooled 
account for all its clients, and moreover, if these shareholdings are also 
pooled at the level of the custodian,
63
 it is not possible to identify a 
particular investor‘s holding, which is usually the case for smaller 
 
58 There are also ―paper shareholders‖ in the UK who directly hold shares with the company 
and thus also directly communicate with the company, and intermediary involvement is 
almost entirely excluded (except for the registrar that keeps the record of paper 
shareholdings). See BIS 2016, supra note 34; supra Part I.B.  
59 Apparently, many brokers do not pass these rights on to the beneficial owners. See BIS 
2016, supra note 34, at 45.  
60 These parties include Equiniti, Capita and Computershare.  
61 See Paul Davies, Investment Chains and Corporate Governance. in INTERMEDIATION AND 
BEYOND (Louise Gullifer & Jennifer Payne eds.,  2019).  
62 Id. 
63 See BIS 2016, supra note 34, at 91. 
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investment funds. In such a situation, there is a large potential for mistakes, 
and the role of the proxy agent becomes more important.   
The Eckerle v Wickeder-case clearly shows the complexities of the UK 
voting system.
64
 Following the approval of converting DNick Holding into a 
private limited company, minority shareholders started an appraisal 
procedure. Yet, DNick‘s shareholder register only included two 
shareholders; the CEO and the Bank of New York Depository (Nominees) 
Ltd (BNY). The minority shareholders were not considered shareholders 
(―members‖) of DNick following section 112(2) of the UK Companies 
Act,
65





C. Cross-border voting and harmonization efforts  
 
In the aforementioned proxy voting systems, the beneficial owner is 
usually not the legal owner of the securities. Also given that in most 
jurisdictions a vast majority of intermediaries use omnibus accounts, both 
the beneficial owners and the issuers largely depend on the intermediaries in 
the chain to pass on information and voting rights. Kahan and Rock (2008) 
proposed the ―Spanish‖ individual ownership model as a potential solution 
to the proxy voting issues in the US.
67
 However, in this system, transparent 
recording for indirect holdings below the first two tiers is lacking, 
particularly for cross-border holdings.
68
 
Moreover, as soon as securities are traded cross-border, there may be a 
conflict between the different intermediated securities systems and the way 
they treat ownership. Some countries turn to hybrid intermediated securities 
structures,
69
 while others simply treat the lowest domestic tier as the 
beneficial owners.
70
 The problems of cross-border information transmission 
and voting instructions between shareholders and issuers in the 
intermediated securities systems are widely recognized in the European 
Union.
71
 The European Central Securities Depository Regulation 
 
64 Eckerle & Ors v. Wickeder Westfalenstahl GmbH, [2013] EWHC (Ch) 68. See Van der 
Elst & Lafarre, supra note 20. DNick is a UK Plc with its management and operations in 
Germany and traded on the Deutsche Börse.  
65 Stating that ―[e]very other person who agrees to become a member of a company, and 
whose name is entered in its register of members, is a member of the company.‖ 
66 See Van der Elst & Lafarre, supra note 20. 
67 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 4.  
68 Supra Part I.B. 
69 For instance, Germany uses the co-ownership model for domestic chains, but a trust 
concept for cross-border holdings. See Dixon, supra note 28. 
70 Id. 
71 This started with the two Giovannini Reports, available at  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/giovannini-reports_en. 




 introduced recording of securities in a book-entry form in the 
European Member States. The CSDR aimed at harmonizing requirements 
for CSDs and allows CSDs to provide their services on a cross-border basis. 
Yet, the Regulation does not harmonize the national corporate law systems 
regarding intermediated securities systems, but allows issuers to choose any 
CSD established in the EU for recording their securities and other relevant 
CSD services. However, contrary to a few exceptions,
73
 CSDs typically still 
operate on a domestic basis within one country as legal models vary widely 
under domestic laws.
74
 Article 3 CSDR holds that all securities of an issuer 
established in the EU should be represented in book-entry form as 
immobilization or subsequent to a direct issuance in a dematerialized form. 
The Regulation thus does not impose one particular method for the initial 
book-entry recording.
75
 However, the Regulation explicitly adds that 
―[i]mmobilisation and dematerialisation should not imply any loss of rights 
for the holders of securities and should be achieved in a way that ensures 
that holders of securities can verify their rights.‖
76
  
The Regulation further mandates in Article 38 that a CSD needs to 
keep records and accounts in such a way that it is possible to segregate the 
securities of an account holder from those of any other account holders, and 
moreover that enables an account holder to segregate the securities of any of 
its own clients. Article 38(5) adds that intermediaries (i.e., account holders 
with CSDs) need to offer their account holders ―at least the choice between 
omnibus client segregation and individual client segregation, and inform 
them of the costs and risk associated with each option.‖ However, in 
practice, the use of omnibus accounts in the intermediated securities chain is 
still widespread. For instance, the UK Law Commission was told that ―many 
brokers will not volunteer the possibility of a segregated account or explain 
the potential disadvantages of a pooled account.‖
77
  
Cross-border voting issues were already recognized with the 




72 Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 
2014 on improving securities settlement in the European Union and on central securities 
depositories and amending Directives 98/26/EC and 2014/65/EU and Regulation (EU) 
No 236/2012, 2014 O.J. (L 257). 
73 See, e.g., Euroclear France operating as a CSD for two Spanish issuers. Euroclear expands 




74 See Christopher Twemlow, Why Are Securities Held in Intermediated From?, in 
INTERMEDIATION AND BEYOND (Louise Gullifer & Jennifer Payne eds., 2019).  
75 See Preamble 11, Regulation (EU) No 909/2014, supra note 72. 
76 Id.  
77 See LAW COMMISSION, supra note 33, at 8.  
78 Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the exercise of 
certain rights of shareholders in listed companies, 2007 O.J. (L 157/87). 
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the SRD I provisions did not solve the existing information problems in 
these cross-border intermediated chains.
79
 Accordingly, the Revised 
Shareholder Rights Directive of 2017 (―SRD II‖)
80
 aimed at improving the 
identification of shareholders, the transmission of information and the 
exercise of shareholder rights through the intermediated systems. 
Particularly, SRD II requires intermediaries to transmit information from the 
issuer down the intermediated chain, facilitate the exercise of voting rights, 
and, upon request by the issuer, to identify the beneficial owner and provide 
information regarding its identity to the issuer to facilitate shareholder 
engagement. Article 3c(2) adds that an electronic confirmation of receipt of 
the votes is sent to the person that casts the vote when votes are cast 
electronically. Hence, SRD II does not fundamentally change the 
intermediated securities systems in Europe by, for instance, ensuring direct 
connections between issuers and beneficial owners or harmonizing the 
current intermediated systems, but rather aims at establishing a more 
efficient cooperation between the different intermediaries in the existing 
chains. The Implementing Regulation outlines the minimum requirements 
for the identification of shareholders and the transmission of information 
and votes in the intermediated chains, indicating that any communication 
should, to the extent possible, be transmitted using electronic, machine-
readable and standardized formats to ensure the interoperability and straight-
through processing (Article 2 of the Regulation). Note that the SRD II 
defines ―shareholders‖ in accordance with the law of the Member State in 
which the company has its registered office, leaving discrepancies in the 
implementation of SRD II and the interpretation of the Implementing 
Regulation.  
 
III. SOLVING THE CURRENT PROXY AND ENGAGEMENT ISSUES 
 
So far, it follows that the main problems with the current intermediated 
proxy voting systems include full reliance on many involved intermediaries 
i) by issuers as to the identification of shareholders, and ii) by shareholders 
for receiving proxies to vote their shares and the verification and 
confirmation that the votes are correctly included in the voting outcomes. 
Significant difficulties arise because of the widespread use of omnibus 
accounts and the cross-border nature of many holdings. Already in 2011, the 
 
79 For instance, the European Company Law Experts (―ECLE‖) states that in cross-border 
situations, ―[s]hareholders often are not informed about forthcoming shareholder meetings 
and cannot ensure that their votes are exercised through the chain of intermediaries. Typically 
therefore the voting rights remain unexercised.‖ See Paul L. Davies et al., Response to the 
European Commission’s Green Paper ‘The EU Corporate Governance Framework,’ 
EUROPEAN LAW EXPERTS 19 (2011).  
80 See supra note 10. 
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ECLE stated that ―[s]hareholders should be entitled to take part in the 
general meeting and cast their votes independently from any intervention of 
the securities depository system.‖
81
 Blockchains may offer this solution and 
provide the needed transparency. Moreover, blockchains can overcome the 
current distance between issuers and shareholders and foster shareholder 
engagement.
82
 In a keynote address for the Council of Institutional 
Investors, Vice-Chancellor Laster already argued that blockchain 
technology can be considered a solution.
83
 Also, the Implementing 





A. Blockchains for Shareholder Voting and Engagement    
 
A permissioned blockchain for shareholder voting operated by an 
issuer, at least in theory, only needs the (full) nodes operated by this issuer, 
the beneficial owners and the CSD, provided that the CSD has real-time 
information about the beneficial owners. However, in practice because of 
the use of omnibus accounts, the account information from account holders 
of every intermediary in the intermediated chain is needed to identify the 
beneficial owner. Therefore in practice, keeping in mind the current 
intermediated systems, every relevant intermediary will run a node, and 
depending on the type of system and the tier in which they are located, some 
of these intermediaries will also be the shareholder of record and, therefore, 
the legal owner.
85
 The vote tabulator can be added, which tabulates the votes 
in real time. Another node that may be added is the financial markets 




81 See Davies et al., supra note 79, at 19. 
82 See Panisi et al., supra note 20; Lafarre & Van der Elst, supra note 21; Van der Elst & 
Lafarre, supra note 20.   
83 See Travis Laster, CII Keynote Speech: The block chain plunger: using technology to clean 
up proxy plumbing and take back the vote (Sep. 29, 2016). 
84 The EC directly refers to ―new technologies that could enhance transparency and trust,‖ 
which are two important characteristics of blockchains. See supra note 19. 
85 If all issued shares were directly recorded in the blockchain including all share transfers in 
real time, uploading a list of beneficial owners to the ledger would not be needed. Yet, given 
the complexity of many intermediated securities systems today, this probably is not feasible 
in the near future.  
86 The 2004 proposal of the Business Roundtable and Georgeson to reform the US proxy 
voting system largely resembles how blockchain technology can be used in the short term, 
actually long before blockchains were considered. This proposal maintains the issuance of 
omnibus proxies to the custodians and brokers, which are passed through to the beneficial 
owners. The key is that these intermediaries generate lists of the beneficial owners including 
the number of shares held at the record date, which are checked by a tabulator that integrates 
one list of shareholders who need to receive the proxy materials and are allowed to vote the 
shares. This integrated list is then made available to the company, which in turn can distribute 
the proxy materials directly to the beneficial owners. Beneficial owners return their proxies 
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Using such a permissioned blockchain, the process flow of a 
shareholders‘ meeting can be as follows.
87
 Firstly, the corporation calls a 
shareholders‘ meeting and uploads the proxy materials in standardized 
form
88
 to the ledger so that the information about the meeting is available to 
all participants in the blockchain (Step 1). It also sets the record date. 
Secondly, the relevant intermediaries upload a list of beneficial owners 
(beneficiaries in the UK, securities entitlement holders in the US) at every 
level of the intermediated chain to the ledger, who are provided access to the 
shareholders‘ meeting‘s proxy materials and with the required amount of 
(tokenized) voting rights (Step 2).
89
 The ownership information should only 
be visible to the issuer (or the CSD or another intermediary depending on 
the architecture of the system) that provides the shareholders with the right 
number of tokenized voting rights. However, to meet transparency 
requirements in the several jurisdictions, particular ownership stakes may be 
disclosed.
90
 Beneficial owners may vote these voting rights themselves, or 
appoint a proxy to vote on their behalf, until a certain cut-off moment (Step 
3).
91
 To make other aspects of formal shareholder voice rights transparent as 
well, shareholder questions (and related answers) also may be recorded on 
the blockchain,
92
 as well as other information such as the minutes of the 
meetings if desirable. After the beneficial owners (or their proxy holders) 
 
directly to the tabulator, and as a result, custodians and brokers (including Broadridge) are 
removed from the proxy votes collection and instructions process. See BUSINESS 
ROUNDTABLE, Request for Rulemaking Concerning Shareholder Communications, Petition 4-
493 (Apr. 12, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/petn4-493.htm. See also Kahan & 
Rock, supra note 4, at 1271. 
87 This analysis is partly based on the CSD Working Group on DLT, General Meeting Proxy 
Voting on Distributed Ledger Product Requirements, Nov. 2017, v.2.1. The first version was 
published in Spring 2017 and its current version was published in October 2017. This is a 
Consortium of Central Securities Depositories that formed a Working Group on Distributed 
Ledger Technology. The Consortium includes NSD in Russia, Strate in South Africa, Six 
Securities Services in Switzerland, Nasdaq Nordic, and DCV in Chile. See Lafarre & Van der 
Elst, supra note 21, at 171-172.  
88 Supra note 75.  
89 Different identification systems for beneficial owners may be used on and off-chain. The 
CSD Working Group on DLT report suggests that the authentication process take place 
outside the blockchain environment, but the proof of authentication should be stored in the 
blockchain. See CSD Working Group on DLT 2017, supra note 90. 
90 Van der Elst & Lafarre, supra note 20, at 118-120 (Current Shareholder Identification 
Framework for the European transparency requirements).  
91 Depending on the legal provisions in a particular jurisdiction, this can be the same moment 
as the physical (or hybrid) general meeting.  
92 In Europe, shareholders have the formal right to ask questions in shareholders‘ meetings 
per Article 9 SRD I, supra note 81. Note that one of the main arguments against virtual-only 
meetings is that board members would be able to cherry-pick favourable questions. Infra Part 
III.C.  
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have cast their votes,
93
 each of them can verify how their votes are cast and 
included in the tabulated votes (Step 4). Shareholders generally should be 
able to see only their own voting decisions and the voting outcomes to 
safeguard privacy. However, for institutional investors, it may actually be 
beneficial to show their voting decisions due to several regulatory 
requirements regarding the disclosure of their engagement behavior that 
exist in many countries nowadays.
94
 Note that this blockchain-based 
shareholder voting system makes it possible to remove all intermediaries 
(like Broadridge) involved in the proxy votes collection and instructions 
process if all ownership information from different tiers is uploaded to the 
distributed ledger.  
There are some clear advantages related to the use of blockchains in 
proxy voting. The most pressing information problem with the current proxy 
voting systems concerns the use of omnibus accounts so that no party 
involved has all information. This results in problems regarding the 
identification of beneficial owners through the chain by the issuer, and the 
ability of these beneficial owners to exercise their shareholder rights. 
Moreover, we have seen that existing discrepancies between legal and 
beneficial share ownership in large jurisdictions such as the US and the UK 
lead to material problems for shareholders.  
Blockchains also make it possible to reconsider a number of 
fundamental issues in shareholder voting and engagement, including 
determining the optimal timing for the record date and notice period.
95
 
Blockchains also revive the discussions on the merits of virtual-only 





B. Current Reforms 
 
Over the past few years, there have been numerous media headlines on 
the use of blockchains for shareholder voting, including the launch of 
prototypes and test cases. For an overview of these initiatives, we refer to 
earlier work.
97
 Here, we address the latest developments in the Australian 
 
93 Or even before, since vote tabulation is available real-time (for those shares that are voted 
on the blockchain), and shareholders do not all vote at the same moment. See Yermack, supra 
note 23. Further analysis is needed to determine whether this ledger for proxy voting can be 
merged with a settlement ledger. In the settlement ledger, buyers are added to the company‘s 
shareholder circle and thus should be included in the voting ledger, while sellers should be 
excluded. Note that in the ASX situation, this is not an issue. Infra Part III.B.  
94 Supra notes 8-10. See also Lafarre & Van der Elst, supra note 21, at n 63; Van der Elst & 
Lafarre, supra note 20.  
95 Infra Part III.C.  
96
 Id.  
97 See Lafarre & Van der Elst, supra note 21; Van der Elst & Lafarre, supra note 20.  
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CHESS system transformation to a blockchain-based system together with 
Digital Assets Holdings, which according to the ASX must be concluded 
around April 2021.
98
 Australia does not have a CSD for ASX-listed 
securities as these holdings are held directly on the issuers‘ records.
99
 ASX 
uses the CHESS system to not only facilitate electronic and paperless 
settlement, but also to electronically register the ownership of shares.
100
  
In its Consultation Paper of April 2018 on the CHESS Replacement 
process, ASX indicated that it ―will replace CHESS with a post-trade 
solution that provides users with more efficient clearing, settlement and 
other post-trade services […].‖
101
 This ―post-trade solution‖ incorporates a 
permissioned blockchain.
102
 In addition to clearing and settlement, the 
Consultation Paper shows other features of the blockchain, inter alia 
providing proxy voting ―for all relevant issuer meetings,‖ thereby indicating 
that ―the record date relative to the meeting date will be standardised so that 
the record date will be a fixed number of business days prior to the meeting 
date.‖
103
 Furthermore, ASX writes that the blockchain ―will streamline 
proxy voting processes by enabling electronic proxy voting, reducing the 
amount of paper and manual processes currently being used to facilitate 
proxy voting.‖
104
 However, there are also opponents to these initiatives by 
ASX. Some ASX stakeholders commissioned a report from Deloitte, which 
indicates that there are competition concerns with the operation of 
CHESS.
105
 Two of these report funders are Computershare and Link 
 
98 See ASX, CHESS Replacement Project Implementation & Transition Webinar 6 (Nov. 29, 
2019),  
https://www.asx.com.au/images/newsletters/Implementation_Transition_Webinar_November
_Final.pdf. Note that the latest developments through March 2020 are reflected in this 
research. On March 25, 2020 ASX announced that it ―will consult on the implementation 
timetable for the CHESS replacement system‖ due to the COVID-19 pandemic, per 
https://www.asx.com.au/services/chess-replacement.htm.  
99 See Clearstream, supra note 37.  
100 See ASX, supra note 37.  
101 ASX, CHESS replacement: new scope and implementation plan, ASX CONSULTATION 
PAPER (Apr. 2018), https://www.asx.com.au/documents/public-consultations/chess-
replacement-new-scope-and-implementation-plan.pdf.  
102 However, some sources indicate that there is no consensus protocol involved in this 
permissioned blockchain to verify transactions, which means that ASX is the only party that 
is able to write to the ledger, making it a private blockchain in more ways than just the entry 
requirements; other nodes have a read-only access, providing ASX full control over the 
blockchain. See Nicky Morris, Australian Securities Exchange blockchain project gets 
political, LEDGER INSIGHTS (2019),  https://www.ledgerinsights.com/blockchain-australian-
securities-exchange-asx-digital-asset. See also Chanticleer, Alarm at ASX's blockchain 
Armageddon, AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL REVIEW (Oct. 22, 2019), 
https://www.afr.com/chanticleer/alarm-at-asx-s-blockchain-armageddon-20191021-p532tc.  
103 See ASX, supra note 101 at 37. 
104 Id.  
105 See Chanticleer, supra note 102.   




 which in their public Consultation 
Paper Responses in 2018 already expressed concerns.
107
 These 
developments likely indicate that the principal obstacles to reform are 
political, as Kahan and Rock noted in 2008 for the US.
108
 Although the 
Australian intermediated securities system for ASX companies (that uses the 
CHESS system to record holdings directly) is less complex than that in the 
US, different parties with different motives complicate the transition 
process. Another large intermediary, Broadridge—considered ―the center of 
the spider web‖
109
 in the US—has been more active than most in the 
development of a blockchain-based system for intermediated securities. For 
instance, Broadridge received a US patent for its permissioned blockchain-
based shareholder proxy voting initiative in May 2018,
110
 which was also 
used at the Banco Santander shareholders‘ meeting in 2018.
111
 As regards 
the ASX CHESS Replacement project, Broadridge indicated that it ―has 
developed a blockchain-based network for global proxy voting‖ and 
―support[s] the ASX‘s efforts to centralize proxy voting activity and the 




C. Implications for corporate governance 
 
The potential of blockchains may well have significant implications for 
corporate governance. Firstly, a potential advantage is real-time 
transmission of the information and direct communication between issuers 
and shareholders. For instance, in the UK, proxy agents usually receive 
voting instructions continuously after the meeting notice, but wait to send 
the information to the registrar until shortly before the proxy deadline, 
which is oftentimes similar to the record date of 48 hours before the 
shareholders‘ meeting.
113
 However, issuers would like to receive the 
information immediately when proxies are cast since ―last minute 
engagement is of minimal value and likely to not lead to changes in issuers‘ 
 
106 Supra note 38.  
107 For instance, Computershare stresses concerns about ASX‘s monopoly position, the role 
of the regulators, privacy concerns and data ownership and control. See Computershare, Re: 
CHESS Replacement: New Scope & Implementation Plan (June 22, 2018), 
https://www.asx.com.au/documents/public-consultations/computershare-non-
confidential.pdf.  
108 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 1279. 
109 Id.  
110 Broadridge filed the application on Nov. 9, 2017, per http://patents.com/us-9967238.html.  
111 Attracta Mooney & Nicholas Megaw, Santander shows potential of blockchain in 
company votes, THE FINANCIAL TIMES (May 17, 2018), 
https://www.ft.com/content/c03b699e-5918-11e8-bdb7-f6677d2e1ce8.  
112 See ASX CHESS Replacement – Consultation Paper Response, BROADRIDGE 5 (2018), 
https://www.asx.com.au/documents/public-consultations/broadridge-non-confidential.pdf. 
113 See Davies, supra note 61. 
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policy or investor‘s voting decisions.‖
114
 In contrast, ―[t]imely and ongoing 
engagement allows for any clarifications to be made and helps to ensure that 
issuers have the support of investors.‖
115
 Since blockchains would render the 
voting information instantly available for issuers, this could motivate both 
issuers and shareholders to increase their engagement and mutual 
collaboration.  
Today, there is widespread use of remote voting in shareholders‘ 
meetings.
116
 This is not surprising inter alia due to the large portfolio sizes 
of many (passive) institutional investors, the international nature of 
shareholdings and the concentration of shareholders‘ meeting dates in a 
small period of time. Although it has reduced the practical importance of the 
physical shareholders‘ meeting, the current practice for most companies 
around the world is to have a physical venue, often reflected as a legal 
statutory requirement.
117
 Current technologies (not blockchains per se) 
already enable virtual-only shareholders‘ meetings,
118
 yet there are many 
(institutional) shareholder objections against these virtual-only meetings.
119
 
Blockchains can help in overcoming these objections, allowing for 
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(2017–2018). The COVID-19 pandemic may well boost the use of the virtual-only meetings. 
For instance, Glass Lewis advises clients to refrain from voting against board members if the 
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120 See Van der Elst & Lafarre 2019, supra note 20. Moreover, since blockchain technology 
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shareholder engagement ecosystem can apply lessons from other blockchain 
ecosystems. For instance, with Bitcoin, developers may provide Bitcoin 
improvement proposals, which are studied and tested by the other 
developers. Once a consensus is reached, a proposal can be implemented.
121
 
The fiduciary duties of institutional investors and their stewardship role 
in creating long-term value are the subject of many regulatory initiatives 
today. Blockchains in this respect do not only make it easier for institutional 
investors to exercise their voice and engagement with their investees 
directly, but also enable them to provide voting and engagement 
confirmation to their own ultimate beneficial owners. Also, the role of proxy 
advisors and to what extent institutional investors follow their 
recommendations will become more transparent with blockchains as these 
actions can be immediately visible and transparent for all parties in the 




Blockchains enable us to address the main problems with current 
shareholder voting and engagement—the identification of shareholders by 
issuers, and the end-to-end confirmation that the votes are exercised by 
beneficial owners and are correctly included in the voting outcomes. In 
addition, blockchains can bring forward timely solutions for pressing issues 
in the corporate governance debate, including not only the strengthening of 
relationships between shareholders and companies in controversial decision-
making and enhancing the stewardship role of shareholders, but also in 
rendering the role of proxy advisors in institutional shareholder voting more 
transparent. However, because of the involvement of many intermediaries 
for whom the introduction of blockchain might lead to disruption of existing 
business models, we expect that reform can take a while, especially without 
any serious harmonisation efforts. It seems that the issues at stake largely 
involve political motives slowing down proof-of-concept trials. If ASX is 
able to keep its announced schedule and launch the blockchain-based 
clearing and settlement system in April 2021, this development may 
hopefully provide the needed positive push to regulators, and particularly 
issuers, in other markets. 
 
121 See Jeffery Atik & George Gerro, Hard Forks on the Bitcoin Blockchain: Reversible Exit, 
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